

# 02 CORRIDORS, CULTURE & CONNECTIVITY

November 2015

## CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR

Security Threats  
& Solutions:  
A Strategy



Naveed Elahi



Pakistan-China Institute

### Corridors, Culture & Connectivity


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## ABSTRACT\*

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a unique strategic project that promises prosperity in Pakistan and has ushered in a new era of proximity with China. But it is faced with a host of security threats that have the potential to jeopardise it before it takes off or midway. The terrorists would like to hit the state where it hurts the most. Hostile countries, perceiving the CPEC as a threat to their interests and influence, both military and economic, pose a threat to the CPEC. China and Pakistan understand the situation very well and seem determined to leave no stone unturned to provide it protection from all kind of threats. Many measures are already in place for this purpose. However it is strongly felt that a comprehensive plan and proper strategy is needed to ensure perpetual protection to the CPEC. This paper offers a four-pronged strategy, which plugs threats from all four corners to ensure complete security to the Corridor.

### \*About the Author:

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## INTRODUCTION

The-China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an ambitious \$46 billion project, which includes connectivity, energy, and infrastructure projects. Estimated to be about 3,000km long, it would link Gwadar port to China's Xinjiang province. CPEC has not only offered great opportunities for the economic prosperity of China and Pakistan but will also give a tremendous boost to their strategic significance. In Pakistan it is considered a game changer and a fate changer. The Chinese term it as a flagship project of the 'One Belt, One Road', which will connect China to markets in Asia, Europe and beyond<sup>1</sup>. However this project is facing an array of security challenges.

Pakistan is fully cognizant of the security challenges faced by the CPEC project. China is also mindful of these challenges and has openly indicated knowledge of these threats. It is an encouraging fact that Pakistan has been taking special measures

1. Zofeen T. Ebrahim, 'China's New Silk Road: What's in it for Pakistan?' *Dawn*, April 20, 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1177116>

for ensuring foolproof security of a large number of Chinese nationals already working on various projects in Pakistan. Presently about 8,112 Chinese workers are executing 210 projects in Pakistan<sup>2</sup>. Nevertheless Pakistan has started taking further comprehensive measures to ensure security of the CPEC and the Chinese working in Pakistan.

The challenges posed to the CPEC are peculiar and palpable. Not only do internal mischief mongers have the potential to throw a spanner in the progress of the CPEC, but the external threats are also quite flagrant. Pakistan has a fair idea of the intentions and modus operandi of both the elements. In fact, military operations are already in full swing to eliminate internal rogue elements like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliates. As a result, the world has seen a visible improvement in the security situation in Pakistan. The external elements that can create impediments in the CPEC are also mostly identified, with a known history of their bellicose approach towards China and Pakistan. Besides these, certain other foreign quarters might view the CPEC as a catalyst to greater proximity between Pakistan and China, thereby fearing a decrease in their influence on Pakistan. Some even view the development of Gwadar port as a challenge to their monopoly over port trade in the region.

Fortunately, the Government of Pakistan, the political parties and the military are all on one page with regards to the CPEC and have not only frequently expressed their strong desire to see this project bloom, but have taken solid measures in this regard.

This study identifies the threats and security challenges to the CPEC and suggests the solutions. In light of the threat assessment, a strategy has been drawn to counter security threats to the CPEC.

## PART I

### 1.1 Background

Ever since 2004 there have been incidents of terrorist attacks on Chinese nationals working in Pakistan. Most terrorist incidents related to Chinese workers took place in some volatile parts of north-western Pakistan and Balochistan, areas that were plagued by insurgency.

2. 'RAW at Frontline to Sabotage Economic Corridor, China Warns Pakistan', *Express Tribune*, May 22, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/890650/raw-at-frontline-to-sabotage-economic-corridor-china-warns-pakistan/>

Terrorism against Chinese professionals in Pakistan actually started on May 3, 2004, when a car bomb in Gwadar city killed three visiting engineers<sup>3</sup>. Most of such attacks on Chinese nationals so far have taken place in the southern parts of the province of Balochistan, where major projects involving Chinese engineers and technicians are located. They were reportedly attacked by members of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

The last incidence of an attack on a Chinese national occurred on the June 22, 2013 when mountaineers were ambushed and killed on Nanga Parbat in Gilgit Baltistan<sup>4</sup>. Gwadar airport, too, came under rocket attack in 2004 when Chinese engineers were engaged in its upgradation. It is a matter of satisfaction that since then, no such incident has taken place. The credit for this amelioration in the security situation goes to the security forces that have been making unrelenting efforts to annihilate the terrorists and insurgents in these areas.

What complicates the threat to the Chinese in Pakistan is the fact, proven through empirical evidence, that the Chinese are killed or kidnapped where Chinese interests clash with those of India. Chinese workers were killed and abducted in Afghanistan and in African states where China was trying to multiply its influence and investment. China is also seeking to secure energy supplies in Africa to satiate its growing energy needs.

In April 2007, nine Chinese workers were killed and seven were abducted at one of the several oil fields operated by Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau, part of China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, in Ethiopia (Reuters, 2007). China is vying with India in securing energy deals in Africa and India has historic links with that region. Similarly, in June 2004, 11 Chinese road construction workers were killed; the victims were part of a team working on the construction of the Kunduz-Baghlan road in Afghanistan, a project funded by the World Bank<sup>5</sup>. Again, Chinese companies were in competition with India in securing reconstruction projects in Afghanistan (Rahman, 2007). India is visibly perturbed about the CPEC as the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi termed it 'unacceptable' during his visit to China in May 2015<sup>6</sup>.

3. Azizullah Khan, 'Three Chinese Killed in Gwadar Car Blast', *Daily Times*, May 5, 2004, <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/main/05-May-2004/3-chinese-killed-in-gwadar-car-blast>

4. Zahir Shah Shirazi, 'Gunmen Kill Nine Foreign Tourists and Their Guide in Nanga Parbat', *Dawn*, June 24, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1020142>

5. '11 Chinese Workers Killed in Afghan Attack', *China Daily*, June 10, 2004, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/10/content\\_338324.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/10/content_338324.htm)

6. 'China-Pakistan Economic Corridor "unacceptable", Modi Tells China', *Tribune*, June 1, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/895611/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-unacceptable-modi-tells-china/>

## 1.2 Chinese Nationals Killed & Kidnapped In Pakistan During 2014-2015

	Number of Chinese Killed	Injured/ Total	Kidnapped	Year	City/ Province	Project	Killers/ Kidnappers
1	3 engineers	6/12		May 3, 2004	Gwadar/ Balochistan	\$250 million Port facilities in Gwadar. 400 Chinese were engaged by China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC)	Remote control car bomb
2	1 engineer		2	Oct 10, 2004	Jandola / South Waziristan	GomalZam Dam	Killed during escape, kidnapped by Abdullah Mehsud, Banuri Masjid (Karachi) warrior
3	3 engineers			Feb 15, 2006	Hub/ Balochistan	Attock Cement Factory	BLA Gunmen
4	1 mechanic			2007	Peshawar	Providing back-up services to Chinese rickshaws plying in city	
5			6 Chinese women, 1 man	June 23, 2007			Jamia Hafsa students

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	Number of Chinese Killed	Injured/ Total	Kidnapped	Year	City/ Province	Project	Killers/ Kidnappers
6	3 workers	1		July 8, 2007	Near Peshawar/ KPK		Unknown gunmen
7			1 (untraced)	May 2008	D. I. Khan	Tourist	SW based militants
8		1 escaped 1 released under a deal	2	September 2008	Swat	Repairing a Telecom tower	Mullah Fazaulah led militants
9	1 Chinese woman	1		February 28, 2012	Peshawar/ KPK		Unknown gunmen
10	2 Chinese 1 Chinese American		1 rescued	June 22, 2013	Nanga Parbat, Gilgit-Baltistan	Mountaineers	Ahrar Group/ TTP splinter group
11			1 Chinese tourist	May 19, 2015	D.I. Khan/ KPK		No one claimed responsibility so far
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>16</b>				

Source: The News International, the Nation, the Diplomat, BBC and the Express Tribune.

This table does not include the data of Pakistanis working on Chinese projects who were killed or kidnapped by the terrorists and miscreants.

## 1.3 Recent Threats to Chinese Citizens and Interests

In 2014 a splinter group of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (TTPJA) warned that it would hit Chinese interests in Pakistan; it released the 9th issue of its official magazine, 'Ihya-i-Khilafat' that carried an article by Ehsanullah Ehsan, a key commander and official spokesperson, under the title of "Hidden Motives Behind the Chinese Investment in Pakistan"<sup>7</sup>. TTPJA asked Beijing to stop persecuting Xinjiang Muslims or face action. The hatred amongst the militants for the Chinese increased after the latter reportedly backed General Musharraf in his stand against the Lal Masjid incident. Lal Masjid students had kidnapped Chinese citizens working at what they stated was an illegal 'massage centre' in Islamabad (The Nation, 2014). The six Chinese women were later recovered.

There have been attempts to kidnap and kill Chinese workers in Hyderabad, Matiari and Sukkur in recent years, but they were foiled by law enforcement agencies. There

7. 'Taliban Group Threatens to Attack Chinese Interests', *Nation*, November 17, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/national/17-Nov-2014/taliban-group-threatens-to-attack-chinese-interests>

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are more than 300 Chinese nationals working on around 30 development projects in the Hyderabad region alone (The News, 2015).

The militant groups associated with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Chinese terrorist outfit, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al Qaeda and the Jundullah could attack Chinese nationals. Sindhi and Baloch separatist groups as well as criminal syndicates operating in the province's rural parts also pose a great deal of threat.

#### 1.4. Threats to CPEC

There are a number of internal and external factors posing threats to CPEC. These threats are diverse as, internally, TTP militancy in Khyber Pukhtunkhawa (KP) and the tribal areas is a threat whereas externally, hostile foreign agencies like the Indian Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) have plans to sabotage CPEC.

The enormity of the security threats can be judged from the fact that the highway project of the CPEC has faced more than a hundred security-related incidents since its launch in March 2014; in these attacks, nearly two dozen civilian and military workers have lost their lives<sup>8</sup>.

In such circumstances it is a challenge for security agencies to provide protection to 7,000 additional Chinese workers that are expected to join the teams already engaged for the purpose of executing multi-billion projects around the route connecting Kashgar with Pakistan at Khunjerab – a point from where China wants to link to Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea.

##### 1.4.1. Internal Threats

- Militancy is a tangible threat to the projects designed for the Corridor. Thus it will be a challenge for both countries to quash militant groups and their fighters along and across their borders. Militant groups have targeted Chinese citizens, workers and engineers in the past (Zaafir, 2015). However, the military operation Zarb-e-Azb has turned the tide and TTP insurgents are on the run. Their command and control structures have been dismantled.
- In Balochistan province, insurgent groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) etc. indulge in anti-state activities

8. 'Sharif, Army Chief Discuss Security of CPEC Projects', *Dawn*, September 5, 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1205028>

and pose a threat to mega development projects in Balochistan, including Gwadar Port. Although their activities have been considerably curtailed due to sustained operations by the security agencies, their capabilities to carry out terrorist attacks have not been crippled to the hilt. On August 30, 2015, nearly a dozen attackers armed with automatic weapons attacked Jiwani airport near Gwadar district, killing two officials<sup>9</sup>. The attackers torched navigation equipment at Jiwani airport before entering the building. "The attackers entered the building and killed a superintendent and injured a supervisor critically," spokesperson Pervez George stated<sup>10</sup>. On September 2, 2015 unidentified men fired two rockets near Gwadar Airport; the rockets landed near a check post but did not cause any damage or loss of life<sup>11</sup>.

Simultaneously, the Government of Pakistan is making rapprochement efforts to bring these elements back into the mainstream. Nevertheless the threat still looms large. On 21st August 2015, four Pakistani labourers were abducted from a CPEC project in Turbat and two days later their bullet-riddled bodies were found near Mirani Dam in Dasht area of Turbat; security forces carried out a search operation and arrested nine terrorists<sup>12</sup>. The Chinese have been closely following the security situation in Balochistan. The Director General of the Department of External Security Affairs at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Liu Guangyun, visited Pakistan in August 2015 and held discussions with Pakistani officials on security matters<sup>13</sup>. Earlier in June 2015, China's Vice Minister for Security Dong Haizhou, on a visit to Pakistan, received security related briefings on the project<sup>14</sup>.

- The militant-criminal nexus in certain areas also poses a threat to Chinese engineers, workers and citizens in the form of kidnapping and robberies. In the past, there have been some incidents of kidnapping and killing of Chinese citizens working and living in Pakistan.
- In Sindh, a small and insignificant group, Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SDLA),

9. Zafar Baloch, 'Two Killed as Militants Attack Jiwani Airport in Baluchistan', *Tribune*, August 30, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/947498/militants-attack-jiwani-airport-in-balochistan/>

10. Muhammad Zafar, 'Rockets Fired at Gwadar Airport', *Tribune*, September 3, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/950280/rockets-fired-at-gwadar-airport/>

11. *ibid*

12. 'Four Bodies of Abducted Workers of CPEC Project Found in Turbat', *News*, August 24, 2015, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-39252-Four-bodies-of-abducted-workers-of-CPEC-project-found-in-Turbat>

13. 'Liu Acknowledges Sacrifices of Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism', *Daily Times*, August 28, 2015, <http://www.daily-times.com.pk/national/28-Aug-2015/liu-confirms-sacrifices-of-pakistan-in-fight-against-terrorism>

14. 'Sharif, Army Chief Discuss Security of CPEC Projects', *Dawn*, September 5, 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1205028>

led by Shafi Burfat and affiliated with the Jeay Sindh Mahaz (JSM), levelled threats against Chinese companies. The SDLA has been involved in many bomb attacks on government installations, especially railway tracks and state-run banks, in the province; however, the recent crackdown and killings of JSM workers in different parts of the province have weakened the group (News, 2015).

- There are chances that external forces can use these Balochi and Sindhi groups to create problems for CPEC projects.

#### 1.4.2 External Threats

- Indian conspiracies to fail CPEC will place Gwadar on the matrix of intense geo-strategic competition (CPGS, 2014). It has been said that Gwadar will intertwine China and Pakistan in a strategically profitable position along the Arabian Sea, stoking up existing Indian concerns that stem from the favourable position China has attained with its 'involvement in nearby ports such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sittwe in Myanmar and Chittagong in Bangladesh' (Chowdhury, 2013). Pakistan's intelligence agencies had collected authentic evidence and proof about the designs of RAW. The Indian agency has already initiated its efforts to try and scuttle the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and it has formed a special cell within RAW for this purpose.<sup>15</sup>
- The Indians are also making an effort to sabotage Gwadar and activate Chahbahar port in Iran. "Thriving on both sides of the divide, India has quietly worked on its Chahbahar port Initiative to provide Europe and Central Asia an alternative, if and when Iran gets out of isolation. It can then skirt into Afghanistan as leverage against Pakistan and China" (Sharaf, 2015).
- The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which is also described as the Turkistan Islamic Party, is based in China's Xinjiang province and largely comprises Uighur militants. ETIM militants are not only a threat to China's stability but also to that of Pakistan. The ETIM had worked in close cooperation with different factions of the TTP and foreign militants, especially Al Qaeda in

15. Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, 'Special Cell Set Up in RAW to Foil Economic Corridor' News, May 11, 2015, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-37418-Special-cell-set-up-in-RAW-to-foil-Economic-Corridor>

Pakistan's tribal areas since 2009. Uighur militancy has been on the rise during the past seven years. The Uighur militants' links with the TTP in FATA pose a major threat to Chinese interests in Pakistan. An Uzbek speaking militant leader Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi released a video message last year directing all Taliban groups to carry out attacks on Chinese embassies and companies and kidnap or kill Chinese nationals.<sup>16</sup>

- It is however a comforting fact that Pakistani armed forces have dismantled the command and control structures of TTP and ETIM in its tribal areas. The President of Pakistan, Mr. Mamnoon Hussain, during his visit to China from 1st to 4th September 2015, informed the Chinese President Xi Jinping that most ETIM militants have been evicted from Pakistan following Operation Zarb-e-Azb. He reiterated Pakistan's commitment towards ensuring the safety and security of Chinese nationals working on various projects in Pakistan<sup>17</sup>.
- Insecurity and instability in Afghanistan are a major source of concern not only for China but also other neighbouring countries including Pakistan, India and Iran<sup>18</sup>.

## PART II

### 1 Remedies, Solutions, Strategies

Terrorist attacks on Chinese citizens in Pakistan have been a matter of highest concern for Pakistan and China. The overall security situation in Pakistan has made the task of providing security to the Chinese a challenge to be reckoned with. The Chinese Government understands the difficulties and constraints faced by Pakistan. It has not only been urging the government of Pakistan to ensure the safety and security of Chinese nationals, working on various developmental projects, but also provided all assistance required in this regard. Besides it has been concerned about

16. Zia ur Rahman, 'Militants May Target Chinese Interests in Pakistan', *Friday Times*, May 23, 2014, <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/militants-may-target-chinese-interests-in-pakistan/>

17. 'President's Remarks in China', *Dawn*, September 4, 2004, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1204765>

18. Safdar Sial, 'China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An Assessment of Potential Threats and Constraints, 2014



the presence of Uighur Islamic militants in its tribal areas (The Friday Times, 2015).

In 2007, the Government of Pakistan had created a Joint Task Force comprising the Chinese Embassy officials and the Ministry of Interior officials to help in enhancing security of Chinese citizens in Pakistan (Rehman, 2007), effectively addressing the concerns of the Chinese Government and defeating the attempts at harming relations between the two friendly countries.

During the visit to Pakistan in 2015, the Chinese President discussed the issue of security for the Chinese professionals working in Pakistan with Pakistani leadership (Dawn, 2015). Pakistan renewed its pledge to go all out to ensure their security and safety.

It is a matter of record that Pakistan has been making serious efforts to provide fool proof security to Chinese personnel across Pakistan. The intelligence agencies and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) were tasked to establish special cells to ensure security of the Chinese nationals. The model adopted by Special Branch Punjab Police is given below to have a glimpse of the seriousness attached to the security of Chinese in Pakistan.

### 1.1 Security of Chinese in Punjab - A Security Paradigm

Special Branch Punjab Police established a Chinese Security Cell in 2010. It inspects the security arrangements at all projects and residences of Chinese citizens living in Pakistan and generates a 'Daily Report' which is shared with the Home Department and the office of the Chief Minister Punjab. The report points out slackness and lacunas in the security arrangements with recommendations to improve the same.

According to the data given in one of the Special Branch reports generated in July 2015, there were 2,954 Chinese working in 131 projects in Punjab and living in 31 residences. About 6,983 security personnel, belonging to army, rangers, police, special branch, private guards, departmental security etc., were deputed for their security. Common security concerns mentioned in these reports include the following: height of boundary wall is short and without razor wire; during movement, no police escort is provided; some projects are without CCTV cameras; observation posts need to be constructed along the boundary wall; emergency evacuation drills are not being carried out periodically; foot patrolling is not being conducted in projects with heavy Chinese presence. This report is taken seriously

by the concerned security agencies as the Chief Minister Punjab periodically goes through it and demands highest standard of security for the Chinese nationals.

### 1.2 Recommendations


- i. A dedicated force comprising army, police, paramilitary forces and private security should be raised, trained and deployed for the physical security of Chinese manpower and assets to protect them from terrorist attacks and kidnappings.
- ii. There should be a greater focus on rigorous implementation of the National Action Plan to create a more secure and terror free environment in the country.
- iii. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) may be activated to monitor the security arrangements for the Chinese and to advise the provincial authorities for appropriate actions.
- iv. CPEC Security Commission may be formed to give sustainability and agility to the security arrangements of Chinese in Pakistan.
- v. Proper legislation should be done to empower PEMRA to bridle negative reporting about CPEC in the electronic media.
- vi. Programs should be shown on the electronic media to promote CPEC
- vii. Print media should establish development cells to regularly give news about development work of CPEC
- viii. There is a need to enhance people to people interaction to create closer affinity and understanding of each other's culture.
- ix. Students must be encouraged to learn Chinese language.
- x. The universities and colleges must sign MOUs for student exchanges and scholarships.
- xi. Exchange of TV plays, movies, literature, cultural troupes can help bring the people closer.
- xii. Intelligence coordination and sharing between provincial and federal agencies and also between Pakistani and Chinese intelligence agencies can

help foil conspiracies of hostile agencies and elements against the CPEC.

### 1.3 Four Ps Security Strategy

In light of above mentioned threats and recommendations a four-pronged security strategy has been devised which aims at providing a comprehensive protective cover to CPEC.

The spirit of this strategy is not only to provide physical security to the manpower and assets but to protect the project from conspiracies, malicious propaganda and nefarious designs of local and foreign elements.



#### i. Physical Security:

Keeping in view the track record of attacks on Chinese projects and personnel, not only in Pakistan but all around the world, the physical security of Chinese personnel and assets in Pakistan ought to be the top priority of the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan is cognizant of this need; therefore a special security division (9 army battalions) consisting of more than 8,000 military personnel and 6 wings of para military and civil forces having estimated 9,000 security personnel – comprising Rangers, Levies, police, scouts – will assist the military to guard more than 15,000 Chinese workers on this route. Over 5,000 security personnel will be from the Special Services Group (SSG) of Pakistan Army who are specially trained for counter-

terrorism and security. The decision to this effect was taken by President of Pakistan Mamnoon Hussain during his interaction with Chinese President Xi Jinping who had reportedly raised the issue of security for the Chinese professionals working in Pakistan.

According to the Inter Services Public Relations this Division will be dedicated for the protection of Chinese engineers, project directors, experts and workers employed on various Chinese funded projects across Pakistan. An army officer of the rank of Major General would head the SSD and he would report directly to the General Headquarters (GHQ).

An estimated 8,000 security officials have been deployed to protect approximately 8,112 Chinese citizens working in Pakistan<sup>19</sup>.

#### ii. Protective Intelligence:

Security of CPEC is not all about physical security and target hardening of manpower and assets. It needs to pre-empt and foil the sinister plans of sabotage and subversion. Only intelligence can ensure this protection. Therefore Protective Intelligence would be a very important component of the security strategy of the CPEC. It will aim at tackling the plans and conspiracies at the source. For this purpose Federal and Provincial agencies will have to work in tandem. Moreover the federal intelligence agencies of Pakistan like ISI and Intelligence Bureau (IB) must enhance their liaison with the intelligence community of China for this purpose. NACTA can play vital role in bringing about coordination among the intelligence agencies and operate as the hub of receipt of intelligence from all agencies for onward transmission to LEAs for timely action.

#### iii. Awareness through Media:

It is abundantly clear that estranged and hostile elements will try to create confusion and mistrust in the public about the Pak-China relations and CPEC through their agent provocateurs and facilitators. For example initially some elements had raised objection about the change in the route of CPEC which aimed at creating mistrust in the minds of the people. Such unchecked persistent propaganda campaign can create doubts about the CPEC project and undermine its process. Media can play an effective role to ward off any such propaganda. It should work on the following

19. Zahid Gishkori, 'Army Assigned Security of Chinese Engineers', *Tribune*, April 22, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/873889/army-assigned-security-of-chinese-engineers/>

lines:

- a) Highlight the significance of CPEC for economic progress and stability of Pakistan.
- b) Create awareness among the public of the nefarious designs of enemies to sabotage it.
- c) Counter subversive activity.

**iv. Pak-China Peoples’ Centers (PCPC):**

The Chinese projects, especially the CPEC, have ushered in the inception of new era of prolonged interaction between Pakistan and China. This interaction needs, not only commitment of both governments but closeness of the people of both the countries as well. Cultural proximity and understanding can strengthen this bond for the times to come. For this purpose exchange of literature, movies, plays, and promotion of language and education can play a pivotal role. Proposed PCPCs can initiate and regulate these activities at all big cities of Pakistan.

This bonding will create better understanding among the public, enabling them to deflect malicious propaganda. It would pave way for a more conducive and secure environment for the initiatives and projects launched by the People’s Republic of China. The exchanges of teachers, students, troupes etc. have already started. But this process needs to be institutionalised. PCPCs can be the best forum for this purpose.

**1.4 Implementation of Strategy**

Goals	Action	Short Term 2015	Medium Term 2016
Physical Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Raise a dedicated force comprising military and paramilitary forces</li> <li>✓ Implement National Action Plan (NAP)</li> </ul>	5000 personnel to be deployed  Prioritize and Strategize NAP and implement highest priority five points	All approved strength of Military and paramilitary, to be deployed by June 2016.  Implement all the points of NAP

Goals	Action	Short Term 2015	Medium Term 2016
Protective Intelligence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Coordination and Intelligence sharing to Pre-empt and foil designs to undermine CPEC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination between ISI, IB, Special Branches of Police</li> <li>• NACTA to play the role of coordinator</li> <li>• Coordination with Chinese intelligence</li> </ul>	Review the progress and modus operandi every six months and bring about improvement in coordination and intelligence sharing
Public Awareness Through Media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ To foil malicious propaganda against CPEC and create awareness among public</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legislation for PEMRA</li> <li>• Take APNS,CPNE on board</li> <li>• Training and workshops for media houses.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustained media campaign through columns, articles, talk-shows and positive news</li> </ul>
Pak China People’s Centres (PCPC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Centres to be established at all big cities</li> <li>✓ With the aim to create cultural affinity and proximity among the people of two nations</li> <li>✓ These centres shall act as hub of literary and cultural activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to establish and run the PCPCs</li> <li>• Arrange for literature, plays and movies</li> <li>• Exchange of cultural delegations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Education and HEC to coordinate with Chinese counter-parts for promotion of language and education and scholarships for students</li> <li>• Universities to sign MOUs for such exchanges</li> </ul>

**CONCLUSION**

CPEC is considered a game changer in Pakistan. It has huge potential to transform the regional dynamics of trade, development and politics very quickly and is expected to boost the economy and usher in prosperity in Pakistan. Besides, it has initiated a new era of reinvigorated Pak-China friendship. Nevertheless, a host of security issues are facing it. China and Pakistan are well aware of the security threats and are employing all resources to counter the same. These security threats can be addressed by deliberate, planned and sustained efforts. Not only is the beefed up physical security required for this purpose but a closer bond between people is essential

to create greater understanding of each other's culture and aspirations. Media can play a positive role to deflect malicious and misleading propaganda against CPEC and the relationship of both countries. At the same time the intelligence agencies must operate in tandem to gain foreknowledge of conspiracies and to ward off surreptitious salvos to undermine CPEC.

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## Annexure A

CPEC –At a glance

CPEC is a framework with energy, infrastructure, port, communication and industry projects.

Gwadar will be connected to Khunjerab through multiple routes as port will serve different markets and destinations.

Route # 1:-Gwadar- Quetta-Zhob-D.I.Khan-Islamabad to Khunjerab.

Route # 2:-Gwadar-Sukkur-Indus Highway to Khunjerab.

Route #3:-Gwadar- Sukkur- Karachi Peshawar Motorway to Khunjerab.

Note: Work on Route 1 has already started. FWO is working for last one year to complete 650 KMs missing link between Gwadar-Sorab. It will be operational by Dec 2016.

